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ABSTRACT: In the context of an increasingly aging population, the sustaining of public 
pension systems becomes more and more challenging. The growing number of pensioners 
together with the recent slowdown in the entire world -and thus, the decrease of contributions 
to the schemes-, forced the economies to review their pension systems and carry out reforms 
that assures their sustainability. 
 This project aims to give a basic knowledge of how the world is currently dealing with 
pension systems and what is the case of Spain, overviewing to the possibilities that the country 
has in order to avoid the system failure. Lastly, the Spanish pension system is assessed using 
the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index, so the weaknesses of the system can be 
prioritized in future reforms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The current debate about the sustainability of public pension systems and the unrest of 
population who fear that they might not be able to receive a pension in the future, makes 
this topic a perfect choice for those who aim to improve the system and help with some 
solutions. It is necessary that the issue is constantly reviewed so better systems can be 
achieved. Thus, the choice of the topic of pension system for this paper is not merely 
coincidence, but the result of the many debates opened about the Spanish pension system. 
The objective of the project is to give the reader a basic knowledge about the contributory 
pension systems, specially how has it been managed in Spain.  
For that, many questions are addressed: What is a contributory pension system? How are 
they organized? What are the problems that they are facing? What is the particular case of 
Spain? After answering all these questions, we will have an overview of the entire systems 
and the particularities of Spain. It will also give us room to answer a necessary question: What 
can we do to improve the Spanish system? 
To answer this last question, the one that can probably contribute something new, two topics 
have been reviewed: the widow’s pension and the comparison of Spanish system to other 
pension schemes in the world. For this, the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index has 
been replicated for the Spanish system, what implies the most innovative part of the project, 
as it has not been computed for Spain so far. It has been calculated using the same guide that 
they use for the rest of countries, which is available in their website, and the data from 
different websites with Spanish statistics and Spanish regulation. Once that the score is 
obtained, we can then compare Spanish system to the other states that are included in the 
Index, finding the Spanish pension weaknesses for which the government should intervene 
first. 
The paper will be structured in the following way: Section 2 will provide us a big picture of 
the pension systems, including the classification of pension systems and the different 
schemes used in the world as well as the common challenges that they are facing. In section 
3, the Spanish case will be explained, including its origin, its situation and the different 
contributory pensions that form it. This last point will be important for the forth section, 
that proposes changes in one of the pensions and then in some issues that affect the entire 
system, as the personal scores in the Melbourne Pension Index suggests, after its calculation. 
Section 5 concludes with the main points of the project, as well as some complications that 
occurred during its developing. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTORY PENSION SYSTEMS. 
A pension, as defined by the dictionary, is an amount of money paid regularly by an 
institution to a person as a financial aid for a particular reason. The origin of a public financial 
assistance for workers that were unable to work dates back to the Bismarck’s welfare 
programs. As he stated in one of his speeches on 1884, his aim was to “give the working 
man the right to work as long as he is healthy; assure him care when he is sick”. Although 
this program was created for few groups of workers and moderately claimed, it is now 
considered as the first modern public pension system.  
During the first years of XX century, few support programs alike were introduced in some 
countries in order to palliate the effects of First World War and Great Depression. However, 
only certain workers such as firefighters, soldiers, policemen or teachers could benefit from 
these plans.  It is not until the end of Second World War that public pension systems are 
introduced for majority of the population and in most of the countries. This spread of public 
pension plans was a consequence of the ever-growing proportion of workers living longer 
but reaching a certain age with impediments to keep producing as in their previous years. 
Once working becomes unproductive, limited or even impossible; the risk of poverty due to 
unemployment is high without the presence of these programs. Thus, governments from 
many countries have assumed the charge of safeguarding a minimum living standard for that 
part of the population that cannot work, especially elder people.  
1.1 Classification of pension systems.  
The government role of providing this financial assistance to people unable to work, evolved 
in two different pension systems, fundamentally because of the dissimilar saving culture of 
the geographical areas (Perotti and Scwienbacher, 2009). The main taxonomy of pension 
systems can be the following: 
1. Beveridge system, mainly used in Anglo-Saxon countries. This system provides a flat-
rate pension to all the individuals in need (i.e. people unable to work with an income 
lower than the established minimum) or to all the retired people in general. It is called 
the non-contributory or care pensions system because it is financed by ordinary taxes. 
The aim in this system is to avoid poverty in old-age.  
2. Bismarck system, spread in mainland Europe, which provides financial support 
under some circumstances such as old age, death of the family breadwinner, 
disability… It is a contributory system, so the income under those conditions is 
contingent on the working earnings during the employment period, and hence, their 
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contribution to the public Social Security entities. That means that the pension is 
related to the person’s earnings and paid with the share of worker’s income devoted 
to the Social contributions. The main motive of this scheme was to maintain a 
standard of living once the worker reaches retirement.  
In practice, we seldom find countries with one of the schemes in its pure form. As we will 
see later in this text, most countries tend to use a mix of both, including non-contributory 
benefits in a form of flat-rate or means-tested income and a contributory earnings-related 
scheme, managed by the state or private funds.  
Besides, contributory systems can be organized in different ways. First, depending on the 
money flow, there are redistribution systems in which the current worker’s contributions pay 
for the current pensions (also known as pay-as-you-go or redistributive system); and the 
capitalization system in which every worker’s contributions are invested for the payment of 
the future benefits (that is, funded system).  
Second, the contributory system can be defined-benefit, so the future benefit will be 
determined according to the contributions made during the working ages; or defined-
contribution, meaning that every worker will account for a benefit depending on the 
capitalized accumulated contributions and the life expectancy. Also, there is another system 
that can be an intermediary of defined-benefit and defined-contribution systems (Börsch-
Supan, 2014): the points system. In this pension scheme, post-retirement benefits are 
computed according to the points earned during the working ages, differing among countries. 
However, it is not always the State that manage the pension system, as there are few countries 
that rely on the private sector (private insurance companies or private pension funds) and 
regulate them to provide a broad scope.  
Even though classifying the pension systems seems easy, the truth is that there are as many 
pension schemes as countries. In fact, the limits to separate one system from another are 
that simple in practice, especially after the latest reforms to guarantee the sustainability of the 
pension systems. There are several ways of arranging one kind of pension scheme and the 
diverse tools used within the same scheme, makes it hard to classify it in one specific group, 
or at least have doubts of which designation would fit better. For instance, consider the case 
of a country with a contributory system such as Spain. If the government stablishes a 
maximum, binding for great part of the population (for example, 80%), what would be the 
limit to call it Beveridge system? What about a pension system like Ireland with a non-
contributory flat rate for all retirees and complemented with earning-related income? Is it 
too different from a Bismarck system with a minimum pension? Of course, there are 
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different legal and conceptual points that would be able to make us differentiate between 
both. As a controversial topic, it is discussed that some governments try to convert from one 
system to another with parametric reforms (such as the “silent Reform” in Spain) (Conde-
Ruiz and Gonzalez, 2017) or how defined-contribution schemes can be achieved with 
defined-benefit systems, with no need of changing the entire formulae (Cichon, 1999). 
Leaving this last topic aside, the next subsection will try to provide an overview of the main 
pension schemes in the world. The aim is to give a big picture of pensions around the world. 
Due to the probable length that it could take talking about all the countries, the OECD 
countries are the only ones considered to have more variety (not only European countries, 
for example) in different continents.  
1.2 Pension systems around the world. 
Ever since the use of pension system has extended, countries have tried to implement the 
scheme that better suited its society, economy (particularly the propensity of their inhabitants 
to save) and situation in general. As mentioned before, it is hard to see a pure system of one 
kind in any country. A pension system based only in Bismarck ideas has been most widely 
used, while the Beveredgian scheme was predominant in Anglo-Saxon countries. However, 
majority of governments have implemented a mix of both, providing a minimum means-
tested or flat-rate non-contributory benefit to avoid poverty together with an earnings-related 
benefit to maintain the standard of living. Also, defined-benefits systems were the most 
common choice in the origin of pension schemes, related to the level of savings and private 
funds too; pace that is changing towards a defined-contribution scheme. 
In addition, the unfunded version of these schemes is the most widespread. Due to this 
system, and also because of the aging of population, financial crisis and the increase of public 
debt, the sustainability and equity of the pension schemes are being the primary study focus 
by institutions and researchers in the last 30 years. 
It is not a subject largely discussed in vain, as the expenditure of old age and survivors’ 
pensions represents the 8 per cent in OECD countries, as shown in the graph below, what 
can be consider a representative amount and more when we realize that the trend is going 
upwards (the data for Mexico for 2012 is not provided, so it is shown as 0, however it is 
increasing, reaching 3% of GDP in 2015). Only the countries with the highest and lowest 
expenditure rate are shown, to ease the visual perception in the graph.  
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Graph 1. Public expenditure in old age and survivors in some countries as % of GDP. 
 
Source: OECD Database 
As we can see, the biggest increase in this expenditure was in Greece for year 2012, although 
the country with the highest expenditure was Italy. Spain, in yellow, has an average 
expenditure in relation with the GDP close to the average. Mexico is the country with the 
lowest spending among the OECD countries. In general, all the countries have gone through 
an increase in their public expenditure in the pension system during the last 30 years. That is 
the main reason why several reforms in the systems of most of the countries have taken place 
in the last ten years, as the crisis have make it urgent the change to a sustainable system. 
The problem is not only the money used for that social concept, but also the risks that it 
entails trying to cut back. As it ensures the income of people in old age, reducing this quantity 
of benefits or the eligibility of the programs, can create a serious problem of poverty among 
elders and, hence, a social issue that can create uproars.  
1.2.1 The Five Pillars structure recommended by World Bank 
As discussed in the World Bank paper recommendations on pension systems (Holzmann 
and Hinz, 2005), every pension scheme should be adequate, affordable, sustainable and 
robust. All these characteristics ensuring that there is no poverty due to increase in longevity, 
the scheme can be financed with no issue and with no incentive problems (such as quit 
working) and able to bear adverse economic or demographic situations. To achieve this goal, 
the same paper proposes a five-pillar structure, arguing that the more diversified is the future 
benefits, the less risk they will have to face and, hence, the more efficient they will be, as the 
different pillars are subjected to different risks. The pillars are the following: 
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- A zero pillar, based in a non-contributory element that provides a minimum income 
either means-tested or flat-rate benefit. This will reduce the risk of people out of the 
labor market for some reason or some other liquidity issues. 
- First pillar considers the income earned during the life time, being a contributory 
element. Its objective is to assure the worker some portion of the income he 
generated during his professional career. This pillar faces the risks that are prominent: 
demographic and political risks. However, in its absence, many people that do not 
plan the future or do not have enough income to save, will also have problems when 
retired.  
- Another element that would have this ideal pension system is a mandatory individual 
pension account, that would promote saving and only be subject to economic and 
interest risks. 
- The third pillar comprises all the voluntary savings for the future that the individual 
can have. Flexible and free to choose, the future elders would have the chance to 
adapt to their needs, their expected income and their mobility needs. 
- The last pillar, the forth one, is an “informal intrafamily or intergenerational sources 
of […] support to elderly”. This would include all the income or benefits in kind that 
the elders can have access to (such as family help, home ownership, health…) 
This is the point that countries are advised to reach. Nevertheless, there is still a lot to do 
from most of them to reach that system.  
1.2.2 Systems used by OECD members. 
When considering the countries of OECD, most of them fall to give a minimal protection, 
that is the zero pillar.  The first one is also broadly used, when the second one is still 
unavailable in many countries. Besides, there are some countries that lack first pillar for 
example but have a third one. In Table 1, below, the public systems of countries in OECD 
has been summarize by defined-contribution or defined-benefit scheme to get a global 
picture of the pension schemes, including the type of financing (redistributive or funded). It 
has been also included the private pension system in case of a lack or minimal public 
contributory system, being the private one compulsory. 
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Table 1. Public pension system (retirement and survivors’) in OECD countries. 
 
NON-
CONTRIBUTORY 
CONTRIBUTORY 
 
Type 
Financing 
 PAYG Funded 
AUSTRALIA MT DC*  X* 
AUSTRIA MT DB X  
BELGIUM MT DB X  
CANADA FR DB  X 
CHILE MT DC*  X* 
CZECH REPUBLIC MT+FR DB X  
DENMARK FR DC*  X* 
ESTONIA MT+FR DB X  
FINLAND MT DB X  
FRANCE MT DB+PS X  
GERMANY MT PS X  
GREECE MT DB X  
HUNGARY MT DB X  
ICELAND FR DB*  X* 
IRELAND MT+FR DB X  
ISRAEL MT+FR DC*   
ITALY MT Notional DC X  
JAPAN FR DB X  
KOREA MT DB X  
LATVIA MT Notional DC X  
LUXEMBOURG MT+FR DB X  
MEXICO MT DC*  X* 
NETHERLANDS MT+FR DB* X  
NEW ZEALAND FR    
NORWAY MT Notional DC+DC* X  
POLAND MT Notional DC+DC* X  
PORTUGAL MT DB X  
SLOVAKIA  PS+DC* X  
SLOVENIA MT DB X  
SPAIN MT DB X  
SWEDEN MT Notional DC+DC* X X* 
SWITZERLAND MT+FR DB* X  
TURKEY MT DB X  
UNITED KINGDOM FR DB(opt) X  
UNITED STATES MT+DB1 DB1 X1  
(1)  In USA, the pensions are financed through general taxes, taxes on private funds and contributions.
MT  Mean-tested 
FR  Flat-rate 
DB  Defined-benefit 
DC  Defined contribution
Source: Own elaboration with data from OECD and European Commission (bibliography) 
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From Table 1, we can see that non-contributory pillars are mostly means-tested (27 out of 
35), whereas 12 out of the 35 have part or the entire non-contributory system as a flat rate.  
Also, as previously mentioned, the defined-benefit scheme is used the most, although there 
is a trend towards the defined-contribution scheme as seen in the latest reforms of many 
states (OECD, 2016). Out of the 35 countries, 12 of them rely strongly in the private funds, 
being mandatory. Only France, Germany and Slovakia have pension points system and 5 
countries use notional defined-contribution schemes. It is also worth mentioning how New 
Zealand only have a zero pillar and there is no public or mandatory private earnings-related 
benefit, though the KiwiSaver voluntary fund is being more and more promoted.  
Finally, most of the public programs are unfunded, that is, pay-as-you-go. In recent years, 
many countries have introduced a special fund that gathers the surpluses of the Social 
Security accounts in good years and use them in times when the expenses are higher than the 
collected contributions (such as Spain), to use that fund in poor financial periods, to prevent 
the increase of contribution rates for firms and workers.  
1.3 Challenges of pension systems.  
Broadly speaking, pension systems were created under certain circumstances and situations 
that have changed terribly. For instance, the fertility rate was high, what was favorable to that 
kind of system and the number of workers was increasing due to the incorporation of women 
to labor force and the flow of immigrants. However, pension systems have not evolved as 
quickly. Instead, they have been slightly adapted not because of the change of living 
conditions, but to financial issues.  
Pension expenditure depends on the number of pensioners and their replacement rate (i.e. 
the amount of the pension benefit regarding their earning during the working life) whereas 
the income to pay for that spending depends on the number of workers and their 
contributions (that is their income). Considering this equation, we can easily see how 
population ageing is one of the main concerns for pension systems. 
People that are entitled to a pension is increasing in absolute terms, as life expectancy is 
increasing; and in relative terms, due to the low birth rate. In Table 2 we can see that, out of 
195 countries, there are 33 in where life expectancy at birth for 2015 was above 80 years.  
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Table 2. Countries in the world with life expectancy at birth above 80 years (2015). 
1 Hong Kong SAR, China 84,28 12 Korea, Rep. 82,16 23 Portugal 81,52 
2 Japan 83,84 13 Canada 82,14 24 Ireland 81,50 
3 Italy 83,49 14 Norway 82,10 25 New Zealand 81,46 
4 Spain 83,38 15 Liechtenstein 82,07 26 Finland 81,39 
5 Switzerland 83,20 16 Israel 82,05 27 Belgium 81,29 
6 Iceland 82,86 17 Malta 81,95 28 Denmark 81,10 
7 France 82,67 18 Austria 81,84 29 Germany 81,09 
8 Singapore 82,60 19 Chile 81,79 30 Slovenia 81,08 
9 Sweden 82,55 20 Netherlands 81,71 31 Bermuda 81,01 
10 Australia 82,45 21 United Kingdom 81,60 32 Macao SAR, China 80,77 
11 Luxembourg 82,23 22 Greece 81,59 33 Cyprus 80,31 
Source: World Bank Database 
The average for OECD countries was 80,3 years at birth for that year. With legal retirement 
ages of 64 years old as average for OECD countries, a person will enjoy pension benefits for 
more than 16 years, a considerable longer time compared to the 3 years in 1960 (as life 
expectancy was 67,4 as average in OECD countries) (OECD, 2015). This is the result 
without considering the real effective retirement age, that is lower in most of OECD 
countries due to early retirement; and that in the 60s and 70s the retirement age was higher 
than the current one. In short, pension plans that were structured to provide income for less 
than 10 years, have now the burden of a population that receives that benefit for double the 
years. Besides, this trend of ageing population is expected to increase, as life expectancy 
increases 16 months every 10 years (Doménech, 2015). Thus, a structural demographic 
problem is latent in many of the pension schemes. We can use the data in the table to get 
same conclusions from each country, bearing in mind that the legal retirement age of most 
of them is 65, 66 for countries such as Ireland and Portugal, 67 for Norway, Israel and 
Ireland; 62 for Greece, 61 for France and Korea and between 59 and 60 for Turkey, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia.  
This issue is worsened when we consider the income side that finance the whole system, the 
workers and employers’ contributions. Not only that workers per pensioner are decreasing 
in number due to the population ageing and low birth rate, but also the last financial crisis 
made the unemployment to rise in many countries, affecting the number of workers 
contributing to the system. Hence, this side is constrained by economic and demographic 
problems that can strive further the sustainability of pension schemes. 
Then, we can conclude that the easiest way of controlling the spending in pension benefits 
is by decreasing the replacement rates (i.e. the ratio of pension benefit to previous earnings). 
The amount of benefits is the parameter that most countries are changing so as to ensure a 
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sustainable system. However, it is the most unpopular measure as it decreases the income of 
a big amount of population and place again the poverty risk debate in the spotlight.  
As shown in Graph 2, below, net replacement rates were between 40% and 104,8% in 2015 
for the main OECD countries included in the graph. The average for OECD is around 63%, 
whereas the average for the 28 countries in European Union is 71%. There are slight 
differences in replacement rates between men and women, but not very significant. 
Therefore, there might be countries that have room for further reform regarding the 
replacement rate that might shift most of this replacement rate to the private sector, as many 
countries already did.      
Graph 2. Net replacement rates in different countries by sex. 
 
Source: OECD Database 
Therefore, diversifying the income sources after retirement among the pillars proposed by 
the World Bank (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005) would decrease the replacement rate from the 
government side but increasing it thanks to private personal funds, rising welfare and 
decreasing the systematic risk of population ageing and economic slowdowns. 
So far, we have gained some knowledge about the notion of contributory pension system 
and some comparisons between countries. The idea was to see how all the public pension 
plans are facing difficulties to provide or maintain all the benefits for what they were created. 
In that way, we can see the context where Spanish public system is situated and where it has 
developed, facing the same problems as our neighbors. Thus, next sections will be devoted 
to look further into the Spanish system, including its origin within the country and latest 
reforms and propose minor changes that might be helpful for assuaging the sustainability 
problem.
0
50
100
A
u
st
ra
lia
A
u
st
ri
a
B
el
gi
u
m
C
an
ad
a
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
n
la
n
d
Fr
an
ce
G
e
rm
an
y
G
re
ec
e
H
u
n
ga
ry
Ic
el
an
d
Ir
el
an
d
It
al
y
Ja
p
an
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s
N
o
rw
ay
P
o
la
n
d
P
o
rt
u
ga
l
Sl
o
va
ki
a
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
Tu
rk
e
y
Es
to
n
ia
Is
ra
e
l
Sl
o
ve
n
ia
O
A
V
G
EU
2
8
Net Pension Replacement Rates Men Women
 13 
 
3. SPANISH CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS SYSTEM. 
Spanish pension system has also been hit by these demographic and economic changes. 
Indeed, it is one of the countries that has been most affected. The reason is that during the 
time that other countries were extending and reinforcing their Social Security systems, the 
progress of Spanish social care was blocked by Franco’s dictatorship, leading to a different 
development, especially when demographic and financial crisis erupted.  
Besides, population aging is more severe (as we saw in Table 2 is the 4th country with highest 
life expectancy) and the last financial crisis entailed more unemployment in the country than 
in most of the European countries, as it popularly known.  
2.1 Quick overview of Spanish pension system origin.  
The different pace followed by Spain and other European countries was seen during Franco’s 
dictatorship as well as the time when the first contributory pension system was created in 
Spain. It was because of the unequal spread of the Industrialization process that Spain was 
left regarding labor rights demand. For this reason, old-age security systems were very 
unpopular at their origin and they took long to reach a considerable proportion of the 
population (Arza, 2009).  
A first optional old-age insurance was created by the government at the same time as the 
National Welfare Institute (in Spanish – Instituto Nacional de Previsión INP) in 1908, with a free 
and subsidized enrollment for people earning less than 4000 pesetas per year. It consisted on 
a defined-contribution plan, as the capital contributed was capitalized and converted to an 
annuity after retirement (Flores, 2015). 
Due to its limited success, questionable sustainability and the social unrest occurring during 
1917, the government enforced first compulsory Social Security system as a tool to appease 
the social uproar and several strikes resulting from the wartime that exponentially increased 
the cost of living. The system was called in Spanish “el Retiro Obrero Obligatorio (ROO)” 
and, after many politic issues, was completely introduced in 1921 and its aim was mainly to 
avoid poverty rather than a mechanism to keep a standard of living after retirement, as its 
average benefit was received as a big part of the pensioners (Terán, 2006). 
After the stagnated period of war regarding political or welfare progress, Franco changed the 
character of the ROO to an old-age allowance, changing the system from capitalization to 
redistribution and including it in 1947 to the Compulsory Insurance of Old-Age and 
Disability (SOVI – Seguro Obligatorio de Vejez e Invalidez). For the first time in Spain, 
workers were paying the pensions of retired workers at that time. 
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2.2 Current Spanish pension system 
This scheme evolved during the years to reinforce its basis and became a strong Social 
Security System defined by its contributory, redistributive and defined-benefit character; 
together with a non-contributory side for the Spanish nationals with the lowest income. It is 
funded in a mono pillar system, financed by the contributions of employers and employees, 
that creates the right of financial assistance for retired workers. Also, it has minimum and 
maximum pension amounts to assure a progressive redistribution.  
It has suffered several reforms from 1985, that focused on parametric changes such as an 
increase in the number of contribution years, longer working period for the computation of 
the pension benefit, new way of indexing the pensions and incentives to postpone retirement 
and to join individual private pension funds.   
Currently, the Spanish contributory system presents the following main indicators: 
Graph 3.  Main indicators of Spanish pension system. 
MAIN INDICATORS OF SPANISH PENSION SYSTEM 2016 
Pension expenditure as % of GDP 10,69% 
  
Average annual pension expenditure per capita 2.563€ 
  
Average annual pension expenditure per +65-year-old habitant 13.686€ 
  
Theoretical net replacement rate (2015) 89,50% 
  
Aggregate replacement ratio  55,49% 
  
Coverage ratio 
  
108,05% 
  
Old-age poverty risk 
(2015) 
Male  
Female 
 
12,20% 
14,80% 
13,70% 
 
Source: Own elaboration using OECD, INE and Eurostat databases. 
The figure that we can highlight the most is the theoretical replacement rate. This indicator 
measures the proportion of income that a pensioner can keep after retirement. It is computed 
as the pension divided by the salary during the working ages. Comparing this ratio to the rest 
of countries, we can say that our pension system seems to be generous. However, as 
discussed in Arza (2009), the theoretical rate does not approach to the effective rate as much 
as the aggregate replacement ratio. This ratio compares the current average pension to the 
average income. As argued in the paper, the theoretical replacement rate is computed without 
taking into account some particularities of the pension benefit formula, what makes it less 
generous as it may seem. For example, the author explains that to compute the pension 
amount the salary is not used, but the contribution basis that is lower and subjected to 
minimum and maximum limits. There are more influential factors that relate to the formula 
itself, but the early retirement also contributes to the reduction of effective replacement rate. 
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The advantage of having this odd benefit formulation, is the high progressivity of our system, 
as mentioned by the same author that suggest this issue. 
On the other hand, and considering the risk of poverty (in the graph for that population over 
65), poverty has been shift from this group to young people (18-24 years), that have now a 
risk of poverty of 32,5%, 15,5pp higher than 10 years ago (when the group +65 had 15,1pp 
more than in 2015) (Eurostat database) 
Coverage ratio is computed as number of pensions to population over 65. The ratio is above 
100% due to the possibility of receiving more than one type of pension simultaneously, and 
also because there are people under that age that can be getting early retirement, survivor or 
disability pension. If instead of using that data, we compute the coverage ratio with pensions 
paid for people over 65, the ratio would be 86%. Nevertheless, this data should be carefully 
considered as we would still face the problem of multiple pension benefits.  
In relation with pension expenditure as percentage of GDP, Spain is below the European 
average (12,8%). However, in the absence of the reforms of 2011 and 2013, it was expected 
to double in 40 years in the best scenario (full employment and high employment rates).  As 
we can see in the graph below, this projection changed with the introduction of the pension 
system reforms.  
Graph 4. Public pension expenditure in Spain as % of GDP. Data and projections. 
 
Source: Ahn et al (2005), Ageing report 2012 and Eurostat (2017) 
The projections made of different years have been gathered in the graph. In 2005, even 
though the crisis did not reach the economy yet, the projections were a considerable increase 
in the expenditure with relation to GDP. At that time, it was expected in 2010 an expenditure 
of 8,9% over GDP, what it became 10,1% in that year because of the recession. Before any 
change in the pension system (and, as we said without the effect of the crisis) it was believed 
that the expenditure was going to reach 15,6% in 2045. Once crisis already hit the economy 
and the first reform of 2011 took place, it was expected almost 1 percentage point less of 
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pension spending with relation to GDP. The best scenario was embodied in the projections 
of 2017, once the Sustainability Factor and Revaluation Factor were introduced, reaching 
13,3% in 2045.  
Also, this indicator is predicted to decrease after 2050. It was expected to be 15,1% in 2060, 
according to the projections made before the 2013 reform and 1,4 points less thanks to it. 
This can be compared to the projections of the Spanish Government (2016), who seized that 
expenditure in 2016 to be 11% of GDP in 2060, whereas the estimations of European 
Commission pointed out that the expenditure would be 11,4% of GDP. 
In any case, with projections of contributions revenue between 9 and 10% (Balmaseda, 
2006), the government quickly intervened and implemented two parametric reforms of the 
pension scheme, that will be briefly summarized in the next subsection.  
2.2.1 Pension system reforms of the last decade and their impact. 
The reform of 2011 was introduced in the system with Law 27/2011 of 1st August. The main 
changes were:  
- Increase of legal retirement age from 65 to 67 years in a progressive way, reaching 
the 67 years in 2027.  
-  Use of the last 25 years instead of 15 to the computation of the pension benefit in 
2022, increasing progressively the period.   
- Raise the number of years to receive 100% of the regulatory base from 35 to 37, also 
in a progressive way till 2027.  
- Change of criteria for early retirement eligibility, as well as more incentives to 
postpone retirement decisions.  
This law also anticipated the incorporation of a sustainability factor that would link the life 
expectancy to the parameters of the scheme, with the objective of maintaining a 
proportionality between the social contributions made to the system and the benefits 
received during the retirement years. This would increase intergenerational equity, as two 
retirees with the same contribution record but different life expectancies would be entitled 
to the same pension benefit in actuarial terms. According to this law, this factor would 
consider the life expectancy at age 67 and in the reviewed year (expecting to reconsider it 
every 5 years) in relation with the one in 2027.  
As we can see in graph 4, after this reform the forecasts of pension expenditure in relation 
with GDP decreased (for example, from 15,2% to 13.6% in 2040). It was expected that the 
changes would appease one third of the expected increase in pension expenditure compared 
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to the spending with no reforms.  (De la Fuente and Doménech, 2013) Hence, sustainability 
was still not ensured. Fairness would be increased although only for contributory pensions, 
what would create inefficiency, inequality and inequity for non-contributory pensions, mainly 
to the lifelong ones.  
As expenditure was increasing exponentially, the sustainability factor was introduced in the 
law 23/2013 of 23rd December with the name of Intergenerational Equity Factor (FEI in 
Spanish) together with a new formula to compute the annual growth of pensions -the 
Revaluation Factor (FRA)-.   
The first factor was planned to be introduced earlier, in 2019, consisting on an extra factor 
in the benefits formula of the initial pension that would reduce the future benefits when the 
life expectancy of population aged 67 increased. This makes the system closer to a notional 
defined-contribution one. However, the difference (and also an equity problem) (Banco de 
España,2009) lies on taking into account the projected life expectancy of the age when the 
individual is retiring (as in a notional DC system) and the life expectancy for 67 years-old 
population at that time regardless the age of the individual that is retiring, as both ages do 
not necessarily coincide.  
Before the law of 2013, the growth of the benefits every year was in harmony with the 
Consumer Price Index. Since this new law, the indexation would consider not only the CPI, 
but also budgetary and economic conditions of the system, reinforcing a balanced system. 
This automatic factor, would allow to equilibrate the system in the long-run, free of political 
decisions. Nevertheless, this tool is limited by the maximum and minimum rates that can be 
applied: pensions will not be increased by more than the Consumer Index Price plus 0,5% 
and not less than 0,25% if the expenditure is greater than the revenues from social 
contributions. In this computation of the annual growth of pensions, the real growth of 
revenues, the one of number of pensions and the substitution effect are taking to the formula 
(apart from CPI), as well as a deficit corrector. The issue of this new reform is that is subject 
to forecasts, as it takes in account the indicators of 11 years (five years previous to the base 
year, the current year and the projections for 5 more years), what creates a risky factor when 
forecasts are not accurate or overestimated by political groups (in fact, the one ruling that 
revision year). 
According to the Ageing Report (2015), both reforms are expected to decrease the pension 
benefits 7% and 24% in 10 and 20 years. In particular, the sustainability factor will reduce 
initial pension a 10% in 2030 and 20% in 2050, causing the highest drop in replacement rates 
(20pp till 2060) in the world, what would position our pension system as the 9th more 
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generous, 5 positions below the status in 2013. Hence, the 30% reduce of expenditure by 
2011 reform together with 2013 reform will equilibrate the balance of expenditure and 
revenues. Some authors agree that the only way of decreasing this expenditure is by reducing 
the generosity of the system or increasing the revenues from workers and companies. (Banco 
de España, 2009) 
In the research field, there are some papers which agree that the reforms make the 
sustainability of the system feasible as it allows all kind of scenarios except falling into 
structural deficit (Doménech R. , 2014). Also, the Experts Committee and Spanish 
Government are that optimistic about the results of both reforms. In contrast, some 
researchers do not guarantee the solvency of the system, stating that the forecasts of these 
two parts are too optimistic or inflated. (AIREF, 2015) 
In short, in case the sustainability of the system is assured, it is through the reduction of the 
pensions of future retirees. Therefore, the initial aim of maintaining same standard of living 
after retirement is going to be deteriorated in pursuit of a scheme that aims to avoid poverty 
at old-age, like the Beveridge pension systems. Pensioners will have to consider shifting their 
savings toward private pension funds in order to live a similar life-style as when they were 
working (same house, recreative activities, spending on descendants, etc…).  
Before that, it is worth to mention that contributory pensions do not consist only in the 
benefits to which pensioners that worked during their life-time are entitled, but also the 
pensions that are paid to their relatives in case of their decease. This kind of contributions 
will be analyzed in the next sub-section, with the objective of question their eligibility and 
lifelong character in comparison with the initial aim of the schemes, so further reforms can 
be taken regarding this topic in order to cut expenditure for the Social Security system. 
2.4 Types of contributory pensions.  
The contributory part of the pension system in Spain comprises not only the pension 
generated by the working-life contributions, the retirement benefit, but also pensions that 
are paid in case of death to the relative survivors of the worker (or retiree). These benefits 
are paid to his partner, the widow; the children, who become the orphans; or other relatives, 
called the family favor (and specified from now on as other survivors’ benefits). Besides, 
there is one kind of contribution that is permanent disability and it is paid to the worker that 
generated the right due to his inability to produce in the labor market.  
These benefits for survivors were established as a mechanism of replacing income when the 
breadwinner passed away or was not able to work and sustain the family. For that time when 
it was introduced, 1900 in Spain, families were structured in a traditional and religious way. 
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That is, the wife was in charge of taking care of the house, children and elders while the 
husband’s work was the main income of most of families. Due to the Christian view of 
family, extended to a great part of the population, it was unlikely to find a family where the 
main components were not married. Women barely worked and if they did so, it was usually 
until they got married or as a complimentary job that was interrupted any time that she had 
to take care of a new (or old) member of the family. This patriarchal vision of families was 
present till late 70s, partially due to the mentality and to some extent because of the 
conservative ruling of Franco. Although the change in mentality and family structure came 
late, compared to our homonymous in the rest of Europe; we can firmly agree that this design 
is not the same anymore.  
Not only that women are not limited anymore to non-remunerated job at home (it can be 
improved, though); but also, that family designs are now multiple: one-parent or homosexual 
families, whose principal components are not married but registered as a de facto couple or 
just living together with no legal ties, people that choose not to have kids or to live alone… 
In short, families have evolved a lot, what has not been matched with the proper legislation 
regarding family assistance. Instead, these kinds of benefits have been growing all along, 
influenced also by its easy access and attractive lifelong compensation.  We can see in the 
graph below how the main three pension benefits have increased in a sustainable way from 
1999. 
Graph 5. Number of pensions by type (1999-2016) – (Retirement left axes, disability and widowhood right 
axes) 
 
Source: Seguridad Social: Estadísticas de pensiones y pensionistas. 
As shown in the graph, the most remarkable growth was in the number of retirement 
pensions, followed by the widowhood one. However, permanent disability did not increase 
that much in number. One of the reasons could be that health care and life expectancy 
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improve in a considerable way during the years, what would restrain the increase of widows 
and disabled people.  
Although the retirement pension is the one with the most weight regarding its number and 
its expenditure, as seen in the graph 6 below, the widowhood benefit is also one to be 
considered due to the great number of pensions received by women.  
Graph 6. Number of pensions by type and sex in 2017 
Source: Seguridad Social Estadísticas de pensiones y pensionistas. 
The figures show how in January 2017, few more women (around 14000) were entitled to a 
pension because of the death of the husband than because their own participation in the 
labor force.  
Permanent disability is not very significant, as it collects only 10% of the number of pensions 
or 10% of the total expenditure of pensions. However, it is worth to mention than the 
amount of men receiving that pension is almost double than women entitled to it, what could 
be an interesting topic for further studies, out of the scope of this paper. 
Widowhood pensions represent around 25% of the number of pensions in February 2017, 
although its expense represents only 17.54% due to the lower average pension. We can see 
these figures in the graph below. 
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Graph 7. Expenditure and number of pensions by type 
Source: Seguridad Social Estadísticas de pensiones y pensionistas. 
The lower average pension for widows can be seen in the graph below. The widowhood 
pension has been the smallest as compared with the other two main ones (retirement and 
permanent disability).  
Graph 8. Growth and avg. monthly pension by type (2008-2017) 
 
Source: Seguridad Social Estadísticas de pensiones y pensionitas. 
The reason is that widows only received around 52% of the contributory base corresponding 
to the worker that generated the right. However, the graph shows that those benefits are 
higher than half of the pensions: this could be because the base for the computation of both 
is the same, while the rates of replacement are different (can be between 50 and 100% for 
retirees, while widows can get from the 52% to 70% of cases in extreme need); or because 
some benefits are complemented to reach a minimum amount. 
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Concerning the growth of the pensions, we see how during the considered period all 
pensions have a positive growth. There are two factors that can influence the increase in the 
average pension over time: the new withdrawals of the retirement benefits are higher than 
those leaving, due to the increase in productivity and, thus, in the wages; and the indexation 
of the benefits to maintain purchasing power when inflation is present in an economy.  
We can differentiate three different periods: 
- The first one, the period before 2010, shows a downwards trend in the annual growth 
coming from levels between 4 to 5% to less than 3,5% in 2010. We can link part of 
this increase to the growth of workers’ income, and the other part to the CPI that 
was around 2,4%. 
- The second period (2010-2013) is characterized for a CPI around 2 and 3%, but the 
slowdown of the economy due to the crisis fully spread in the labor market, 
deteriorating the increase of salaries. Then, we see the growth stagnated around CPI 
value, as the difference of the entry and exit pensions decreased a little bit. 
- Last period starts with the introduction of the Annual Revaluation Factor (FRA) with 
the pension reform of 2013.  As the deficit is a present in the current situation, the 
limit of the indexation is 0,25%. For this period, difference average pension for those 
that leave the system and the new pensioners decreases. Altogether, it results in a 
stagnation of the growth on average pension of around 2%. 
This differences in the pensions that are out of the pension scheme in that year, and new 
entrants are shown in the graph 9 below. The initial pensions are around 40 to 50% higher 
than the ones finishing in that year. Another point to bear in mind, to compare both averages, 
is that exiting pensions have been suffered revaluations every year during all the years that 
have been received. The new ones, instead, did not suffer any revaluation and are subject to 
increases in the future (well, maybe once the Social Security revenues increase over the 
expenditures). 
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Graph 9. Difference of average new pensions and average leaving pensions in Euros and difference in %. 
 
Source: Seguridad Social Estadísticas pensiones y pensionistas. 
 Once we have the general picture of Spanish contributory system, its challenges, reforms 
and types of pension that considers; it is time to try to give solutions to assure the balance 
of the system or at least try to improve the formulation of the entire scheme.  
With that purpose in mind, the next section will briefly mention the proposals made by many 
researchers, institutions and advisers related to the topic. As the papers advising 
improvements for the current retirement pension system is wide and very complete, we will 
focus our attention on the survivors’ benefits, specially the widowhood ones. This topic has 
also been extensively researched but not in the same extent as retirement pensions.  
Furthermore, although comparisons are odious, there is nothing better as learn from other 
countries experiences. Hence, we will try to see what Spanish main weakness are in the 
pension system if we compare to the countries that enjoy the best schemes. We have to bear 
in mind that comparisons and results have to be taken with caution, as every country is 
different: can support more or less fiscal policies, economies and culture can have a huge 
gap, etc… 
4. MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE SPANISH PENSION SYSTEM. 
There are seldom papers that review the Spanish (or any) pension system and do not propose 
measures to assure sustainability, increase equity, avoid poverty, influence less in 
competitiveness, incentive private savings, or any other action that can improve any 
characteristic of the system and, thus, the standard of living of their citizens.  
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First, we will see a review of the main proposals in some literature, then we will suggest 
further reforms by looking at the widowhood pension, and in the last part the main 
weaknesses of the Spanish pension system will be assessed, being the ones that the changes 
should focus on. 
3.1 Proposed improvements in Spanish pension system by many literatures. 
In the pensions field, there is still a lot to do, not only regarding the sustainability of the 
system but also other principles such as equity, transparency and adequacy. It has been 
already more than three decades of several reforms in almost every country with a minimum 
public pension coverage.  
As explained in section 2.2, the latest reforms in the Spanish pension system increased the 
retirement age, the contribution years to be entitled to 100% of the base considered for the 
computation of the pension benefit as well as the working ages included in that base. Also, 
the reforms included a formula for indexation of the benefits and the link of retirement age 
to the amount of the initial pension.  
However, many authors agree that the reforms are not enough or can be improved. Some 
argue that some parametric reforms should be taken further in order to postpone retirement 
age or disincentive early retirement as life expectancy keeps increasing, such as increase 
retirement age or contribution years (Gaya, et al., 2013; European Comission, 2012; OECD, 
2017; Banco de España, 2009). Some of the authors propose, as it is already the norm in 
other neighbor countries, to use the entire work history to compute the regulatory base used 
to calculate the benefits (Ayuso, et al., 2013; Hernández de Cos, et al., 2017). 
Regarding the growth of the benefits every year, there are alternatives to our new system, the 
Annual Growth Factor (FRA). Some papers give the alternative of linking the indexation 
with economic factors such as GDP or the ratio of contributors and pensioners (Gaya, et al., 
2013), whereas using our own system, there are also recommendations to improve its 
transparency and adequacy regarding the estimations used for the calculations (AIREF, 2015; 
Conde-Ruiz, 2017). Another interesting measure is to create a maximum limit of purchasing 
power loss during the retirement period due to the current tool that implies for the next four 
decades at least, a quasi-halt of pension growth. (Conde-Ruiz, 2017) 
From the side of the generosity of the benefits, there are multiple advises that have in 
common the decrease of the future benefits of the pension. These are the reduction in the 
replacement rate, especially for the minimum contribution years that entitled the recipient to 
50% of the regulatory base, together with the reduction of the percentage-point increase with 
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per contribution extra year (Banco de España, 2009; Hernández de Cos, et al., 2017; Conde-
Ruiz, 2017). 
There is no such an agreement when it comes the revenue side. Some authors are in favor 
of increasing the contribution rate or removing the limits of maximum and minimum 
contributions, despite the problems that would generate as for employment incentives and 
productivity of workers with the highest salaries (Banco de España, 2009; Hernández de Cos, 
et al., 2017). While other institutions believe that contribution rates are high enough, so the 
solution could be decrease them for low-wage workers (OECD, 2017), or decrease them in 
general to boost hiring (Doménech, 2015). 
In line with this last point, many researchers highlight the importance of stimulating the labor 
market in order to improve the finances of the Social Security system. Measures such as 
increase of participation rate, improve learning, adaptation and conditions for old-age 
workers, decrease unemployment rate and, in general, simplify and strengthened the labor 
market to receive more contributions and facilitate a longer stay for people close to 
retirement (Ayuso, et al., 2013; European Comission, 2012; Doménech, 2015)  
Besides, it is contemplated the option of increasing general or indirect taxes (Doménech, 
2015; Conde-Ruiz, 2017) or change some of the survivors’ benefits to the non-contributory 
side of the system (Hernández de Cos et al., 2017); even reducing them to cases of need or 
temporary (Ojeda, 2008; OECD, 2010). 
Finally, a structural reform has been recommended by several literatures, in the way of a 
notional defined-contribution system such as the ones in Italy or Sweden (Hernández de Cos 
et al., 2017; Conde-Ruiz, 2017) and even adding a new second pillar, based on private funded 
pension plans (Banco de España, 2009; Ayuso et al., 2013, Doménech, 2015) 
3.2 Review of the survivors’ spouse benefit in Spanish system: the widowhood 
pension. 
With the aim of maintaining the standard of living of a family whose breadwinner have 
deceased, the survivors’ benefits came into place around the 50s. The typical Spanish 
conception of family structure was the man, in charge of economically finance the household 
of which he was the head; and the wife that had to take care of the housework and take care 
of elders and children, dedicating her life to the non-remunerated work. It was not only on 
the social conception but also in the regulations and policies that usually discriminated 
between men and women, usually with less rights and subordinated to the male society.  
Hence, the loss of the head of the family was a tragedy as no person working meant no 
income coming in in that household. That benefit sustained its foundation in the tragedy that 
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it was to have a family composed only by people not able to produce in the labor market. 
Also, part of its reasoning was the obligation of the partner of assuring a provision of food 
to the other side (in that era, mainly to women).  
At that time, and considering the composition of the family that was mostly married, did 
barely divorced due to religious matters and conceived the marriage as the union to procreate; 
survivors’ benefits were a great support as this contingency -the death of the breadwinner- 
originated in most of cases a situation of need for the family.  
All reasons mention above to justify the intervention of the government with survivors’ 
benefits, can be now questioned due to the change and evolution of Spanish society, the 
structures of households and specially the introduction of women to labor market. Thus, as 
Spain has progressed from a patriarchal country to a multi-structured one, Spanish regulation 
should have evolved consequently. Instead, we have gone backwards from providing this 
assistance in cases of need with its introduction in 1946 to any case where the marriage status 
(or later the de facto couple) was fulfilled. 
Spain is considered as “pensioners” country, as the access to them are relatively easy 
compared to other countries and not only that but also the generosity of the programs. 
Therefore, the foundation and the largess should be reconsidered with more emphasis when 
the demographic and economic crisis in making the entire contributory system unstable. By 
learning from other experiences and adapting to the ever-changing society, a more equal and 
efficient system can be achieved.   
3.2.2 Widowhood pensions in our neighbors’ pensions schemes.  
Regarding the survivor spouse benefit, most of European countries require the recipients to 
provide economic dependence reasons to be entitled to that kind of pension. These 
requirements usually include being in charge of children under 18, disability problems or the 
reach of certain age that their introduction to the labor market could be difficult or 
impossible. Besides, many countries differentiate between a pension paid during a period of 
time (pre-defined or till one of the conditions change) and another one that will last her entire 
life for exceptional cases. 
Following this line, Germany and United Kingdom have two different pensions one of 
lifelong character, in case of being older than 45 years old and a temporary one, when the 
survivor has to take care of under 18 years-old children.  Netherlands, also have the same 
requirements offering only the lifelong pension as well as Belgium, in which the possible 
benefits are means-tested. Temporary benefits exist in Sweden in case of having a child and 
expires when he turns 12 years old.  
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If we take a look to France’s widowhood pension system, its difference lies in a limit of 
maximum income that the benefit can provide. Also, they only offer this program for 
survivors who are between 50 and 55 years old.  
Nevertheless, we can find survivors’ pension schemes in different extremes. On the one side, 
Denmark and Iceland do not provide this kind of benefit, but tried to disperse it in different 
assistances or orphanage benefits.  
On the other hand, and closer to the Spanish system, Norway and Italy offer widowhood 
benefits for life. Both require a minimum of contribution years (5) or having a child in the 
case of the Nordic country. Our closest neighbor, Portugal, has a replacement rate for 
widows of 60%.  
In short, most the mentioned systems require the condition of economic dependency on the 
death member to provide the survivor a pension, either temporary or lifelong.  
3.2.1 Current situation and the evolution with social progress. 
Currently, the requirements for being entitled to a widowhood pension system in Spain are: 
a) A minimum contribution days by the death spouse of 500 days in the last 5 years.  
b) A period of cohabitation before the death for marriages or de facto couples (1 or 6 
years, respectively) or a food compensation in cases of divorce or marriage nullity.  
If both conditions are fulfilled, the widow will receive 52% of the contributory base 
generated by the deceased spouse for life. This rate can be increased in case that the situation 
of the spouse is special; that is, having kids in her care, being older than 40 or being disabled 
to work. Furthermore, this benefit can be perceived regardless other sources of income, 
including other pensions.  
Sustainability of contributory pensions is a challenge per se, to some extent because of the 
increase in life expectancy (retirees getting the benefit for longer periods). The problem is 
worsened when it is link more to female life expectancy that the one of men. This is the case 
when once a retiree died, the widow starts receiving his pension or part of it.  
We see in the graph 10, how women’s life expectancy at 65 is higher in around 4 years and 
projected to keep that distance.  
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Graph 10. Life expectancy for Spanish people in number of years by sex. 
 
Source: INE 
Using the data of Spanish Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), we see that 
average marriage age is 3 years higher for men than for women (37,2 vs 34,15 years on 
average). Together with the 3 years of difference of life expectancy, we can conclude that for 
that retired population, the widowhood pension will be paid for 7 years more on average.  
It is also remarkable that due to the change in family structures and female participation rates 
(as we will see later), more survivors’ will incur in two different pensions at the same time, 
both of them subject also to minimum pension benefits. Female pensioners that were entitled 
at the same time to retirement and widowhood benefits were 13,79% of the total women 
receiving a pension in 2013, whereas this number was only 2,44% for men. The growth of 
this collective is also increasing, as the annual variance went up from 1,85% in 2003 to 2,97% 
in 2013. In the coming decades, it is expected to have concurrence rates of almost 53% 
among women and 23% among men. (Alaminos and Ayuso, 2015) 
More and more households whose women are participating more in the labor market see 
their structure changing towards a more equalized one.  
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Table 3. Evolution of household composition. 
  
1991 2001 2011 
TOTAL OF HOUSEHOLDS 11852075 14187169 18083690 
1 member 13,34% 20,28% 23,19% 
2 or more members 10270768 11310597 13890370 
  
86,66% 79,72% 76,81% 
2 to 5 members 9321658 10774789 13569350 
  
78,65% 75,95% 75,04% 
2 members 2754017 3582177 5441840 
  
23,24% 25,25% 45,91% 
Households with more than 1 member working 3236990 4803195 4990405 
 
Over household total 27,31% 33,86% 27,60% 
 
Over households with 2 or more members 34,73% 44,58% 35,93% 
Households with 2 to 5 members with more than one 
working 
2723113 4375700 4824775 
 
Over household total 22,98% 30,84% 26,68% 
 
Over households with 2 to 5 members 29,21% 40,61% 35,56% 
Households with 2 members with both working 385520 770882 1624680 
 
Over household total 3,25% 5,43% 13,71% 
 
Over household with 2 members 14,00% 21,52% 29,86% 
Source: INE – Censo de Hogares y Viviendas 
Although the number of households with one member is increasing, so is the number of 
them with only 2 members. The reason can be associated to the decrease of fertility rates, 
the more opened society to divorces and in case of the bimembral families, the decrease in 
fertility rates (and thus families that decide not to have children). We can see in the data that 
in general from 1991 to 2011, the proportion of households in which at least 2 members 
work have increased (although there is a decrease from 2001 that can be sustained in the high 
unemployment in 2011, as one of the worst years during crisis). In special, households with 
2 people where both of them work have increased till almost 30%.  Therefore, we can see an 
upwards trend to the houses where both main members are in the labor market, reducing 
the situation of need in case that one passes away.  
The increase comes from the growth of female employment rate all along. It was not till 
Franco died, that the ruling and economy opened up towards the introduction of women in 
the labor force and the equalization of rights in many aspects. Also, laws and cultural factors 
were changed to promote their participation (maternity leave, the change of the vision of 
women as homemakers, acceptance of contraceptive methods…).  
In the following graph, we can see this increase in women’s employment rate: 
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Graph 11. Female and male employment rates by age. 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Although there is still a gender gap, women employment rates have grown quickly and seem 
to keep that upwards trend in the nearest future. The only exception we can appreciate is the 
fall in this growth or even the decrease of participation rate from year 2008, the beginning 
of the crisis. It is a slower growth for women between 29 and 49 years old but a decrease for 
those younger ones. Their smaller participation can be because of: i) the financial crisis that 
started in 2008, youth employment has been the worst affected, making them to decide to 
keep study longer or discouraging them to keep looking for a job; ii) the choice of studying 
to more advanced levels has increased over the years, not only because of the crisis but also 
because they want to be better prepared, hence, they stay out of the labor force for longer 
periods.  
Men’s participation has been stagnated instead, suffering a decrease from the financial crisis 
due to the discouraging effect mentioned before. The difference of their employment rates 
and women’s ones was big (around 30 and 50 percentage points in 1986) at the beginning of 
the considered period, whereas the difference has decreased to around 10 percentage points. 
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Analyzing the graph, let’s consider the women who are going to retire soon (group of 50 to 
64 years old). Their employment rate is almost 50%, and fifteen years back, in 2001, their 
employment rate was also around 55% and again 15 years back, more than 30% of them 
were working. This can mean that half of them will probably have at least a minimum 
contribution period of 15 years, and it is likely that for many of them the contribution years 
are more.  
Therefore, we see that in the same generation employment rates are lower at the beginning 
of the working period but increases quickly, maybe due to the mentioned education factor, 
and drops a bit again after certain age. If we take a look of the next generation that will retire, 
the group of women between 25 to 49 years old, more than 60% of them are already working, 
contributing already to the Social Security system and probably generating higher retirement 
benefits as contribution years are likely to be higher.  
These people working is not always the same, as workers combine employed, unemployed 
and inactive periods. If instead of taking a look to employed people (what is hard in a society 
where unemployment is above 20%), we rethink that active people -working or at least 
looking for a job- we can see how many women are at least active in the labor force, so it is 
likely for them that they do not completely depend on the husband’s income, as it used to 
happen before.   
Graph 12. Female activity rates by age. 
 
Source: Eurostat 
The activity rater trend is more or less similar to those on employment rates. For obvious 
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female labor force. In fact, the average difference is around 20 percentage points, figure 
around the unemployment rate that we have faced these last decades.  
Again, between 60% to 80% of the female Spanish population are looking for a job or 
working, and thus likely to have right of pension benefit by themselves (and not through a 
partner). In case the widowhood is not revised, we have seen that it is easy to reach the 
expected 53% of multiple pensions.  
Accordingly, it is important and urgent to adapt the system to this new reality and avoid an 
unsustainable system that overprotects only a part of the population (with no apparent 
reason) whereas strives to provide a basic coverage to that people that will need it the most.  
3.2.3 Change proposal and possible outcome. 
As explicitly say in the section 14th of Spanish Constitution: “Spaniards are equal before the 
law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of bith, race, sex, religion, 
opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance”. It is striking, then, that 
a marital status can be decisive for the right of getting a benefit instead of the condition of 
need.  
Different authors have proposed to introduce a system such as the German one, with two 
different benefits (Lopeza Lerma and Pozuelo, 2009) or only in the case that the survivor 
depended on the spouse income for living (Ahn and Felgueroso, 2007), other proposal was 
to reduce the benefit in relation with the years that the worker already received the retirement 
pension (Sanabria and Hernández, 2010). This two measures just try to reduce either the 
eligibility or the amount of survivors’ benefit. 
To boost this principle of equality, one of the best options is to replicate the Danish system 
and dissolve the benefits to different means-tested financial assistance. This would assure an 
assistance based in the condition of need of the population. This would reduce the 
discrimination against single people and single parents and the penalty of not formalizing a 
family in front of a State authority (either Registry office or Couples census).  
Usually there are three cases that countries consider special to be eligible for a widowhood 
benefit: a certain age where employment incorporation gets harder, usually around 45 and 50 
years or older; a disability that precludes the person to join the labor force; and the care of 
children that cannot work. For the first case, we have seen in employment rates that the 
figures of women not working are lower and lower over time, what will make this problem 
only for a small part of the population. In cases where these people do not have other 
income, the zero pillar of the Spanish system should provide them a minimum income to 
avoid the risk of poverty. The second requirement can also be integrated in the disability 
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pensions that are paid by the government. As this population can be also in risk of not having 
contributed to the system, a minimum financial assistance should be assured. 
The third condition is having children under their care. Lone-parent families should be 
eligible for assistance either if one of the parents passed away or just is not part of the family. 
Orphanage pensions can be reinforced to compensate the loss of a deceased parent. 
Reinforcing all these benefits, the financial risks that a family can face when one of the main 
members is no longer alive disappears, as it does when there is no marriage but the problem 
is faced anyway. Also, the system would assure that the pensions are not received 
indiscriminately, but only by those families that need them.  
Although the burden would shift to the non-contributory (although in a smaller extent), the 
contributory system would decrease the expenditure by 17,54% (the proportion of 
expenditure for this kind of benefit), corresponding to a 1,88% of the expenditure in 
pensions over GDP. It does not seem to be a big amount, but a relief for the system that is 
facing the worst years and a help for the indexation of pensions, that would start growing 
before than expected so the pensioners will not lose purchasing power for such a long time.  
This measure would be one of the options, in one extreme of the balance. However, if the 
government still tries to palliate that sudden loss, another option is to provide a temporary 
pension for those widows that are more vulnerable. 
To see how much this would be the cost, let’s consider that in January 2017 only the pensions 
that started on 2015 (from 1st of February), 2016 and January 2017 will be paid. Let’s consider 
that those pensions do not finish within that period, so all of them will be paid during the 
two years. Also, as the requirements for vulnerability would make some of them be out of 
the eligibility, let’s consider that that amount of people is counterbalanced with the extension 
of the pension eligibility to those families that were not married but live together also for 
one year. The assumption that both groups will have approximately the same number of 
people is far from real, but will simplify the study and allow us to see the difference of the 
current spending and the one of the new model.  
The number of pensions to be paid in January 2017 would be 260.391. Using the average 
widowhood pension for that the new beneficiaries (678,67€), the total spending would be 
176.720.262,5€. The current figures for the widowhood pension in that month was over 2 
million pensions, an average pension of 642,85€ and, hence, an expenditure of 
1.516.528.150€. Comparing both scenarios, the expenditure with a temporary pension would 
be 11,65% of the current one, that is a decrease of the widowhood expenditure of 88,35% 
in that month.  If this proportion is stable over time, the expenditure over GDP would be 
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decreased a 1,66%, not far from the removal of the entire widowhood pension system. 
(Seguridad Social Estadísticas pensiones y pensionistas) 
In conclusion, either if the system changes to rely more on zero pillar benefits, or a pension 
for a transitional duty is paid -transitional as it prepares the beneficiary to a new life-; 
widowhood benefits should be reconstructed and channeled to the real aim of preventing 
poverty and social exclusion.  
3.3 Lessons from other countries. 
We have seen that every country has a way of addressing the pension problem. There is no 
perfect scheme, as all of them are threatened by common problems such as population ageing 
and old age poverty to some extent. Nevertheless, there are specific issues that some 
countries are managing better than others, and also the opposite: weaknesses of every 
country, that should be a priority for them to change. 
In order to benchmark the strong and weak points of different pension systems, the 
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index has been published from 2009 with new revisions 
every year. It measures adequacy, sustainability and integrity of different pension schemes, 
thus allowing governments to see what areas they should prioritize to improve as compared 
to other countries. The index observes more than 40 issues that affect the pension systems 
and then give a score to every country depends on a score frame that it established. 
“Compared to other countries” means that this frame of scoring is made by considering the 
situation of many countries with regards to an issue, and then give a maximum score or 
minimum score depending of the countries’ observed values. 
It would be perfect to see Spanish pension system’s weaknesses and strengths, so reforms 
can be channeled in first place to those issues. Nevertheless, Spain has not been included in 
this index so far. 
As the index provides all the questions and score guide in its publications, the same study 
has been performed in this paper for the year 2015 (the time of the last publication) in Spain, 
using data from different websites such as OECD, Eurostat, INE and BOE publications for 
all related to regulations. All the results as well as the score given to each of the questions are 
shown in Annex A, at the end of this paper. 
We should bear in mind, that even if the same questions have been answered, there might 
be differences in the data they used and the used here, and also in the legislative questions, 
in which a score between 2 and 0 was provided subjective to the researchers opinion, what 
will be definitely impossible to imitate. Thus, the final score might vary from the one that 
the Melbourne Index’s specialist would provide and the one here.  
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In the next table, we can see the score that we have prepared for Spain, together with the 
current scores of Denmark and Netherlands, which are the best positioned countries in the 
index: 
Table 4. Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index for Spain (hypothetical), Denmark and Netherlands. 
   Spain Denmark Netherlands 
Adequacy sub-index 40% 77,88 75,80 78,2 
Sustainability sub-index 35% 21,12 85,30 77,00 
Integrity sub-index 25% 71,78 81,40 87,70 
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index  56,49 80,53 80,1 
Source: Own elaboration of Spain index and Mercer (2016) for Denmark and Netherlands. 
As we can see, the worst score goes to the sustainability sub-index, which involves the 
coverage and size of the private pension and the demographic issues of the country. Let’s 
take a further look to this part of the index: 
Table 5. Substainability sub-index questions- 
 
  
Spain Denmark Netherlands 
S1 
What proportion of the working age population are members of private pension 
plans? 
20% 2,68 10,0 10,0 
S2 
What is the level of pension assets, expressed as a percentage of GDP, held in private 
pension arrangements, public pension reserve funds, protected book reserves and 
pension insurance contracts? 
20% 0,82 10,0 10,0 
S3 
What is the current gap between life expectancy at birth and the state pension age? 
20% 2,99 6,3 5,5 
What is the projected gap between life expectancy at birth and the state pension age in 
2035? (This calculation allows for mortality improvement.) 
What is the projected old-age dependency ratio in 2035? 
What is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) averaged over the last seven years? 
S4 
What is the level of mandatory contributions that are set aside for retirement benefits 
(ie funded), expressed as a percentage of wages? These include mandatory employer 
and/or employee contributions towards funded public benefits (ie social security) 
and/or private retirement benefits. 
15% 0 10,0 6,7 
S5 
What is the labor force participation rate for those aged 55-64? 
10% 3,65 5,7 5,6 
What is the labor force participation rate for those aged 65+? 
S6 
What is the level of adjusted government debt (being the gross public debt reduced by 
the size of any sovereign wealth funds that are not set aside for future pension 
liabilities), expressed as a percentage of GDP? 
10% 0 7,0 5,5 
S7 
In respect of private pension arrangements, are older employees able to access part of 
their retirement savings or pension and continue working (eg part time)? 
5% 9 10,0 10,0 
If yes, can employees continue to contribute and accrue benefits at an appropriate 
rate? 
Source: Own elaboration for Spain and Mercer (2016) for Denmark and Netherlands.  
We can see that Spanish system main problems are the life expectancy, old-age participation 
rate and the private plans. 
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Regarding the first one, the score (and thus the system) can only be improved by increasing 
the state pension age or carrying out policies to increase the fertility rate. Also, it is important 
to assure that old-age population has access to jobs in the labor market. Thus, policies 
towards the conditioning of the market should be taken, so the physical conditions are not 
an impediment for them to keep working and employers do not discriminate because of age. 
Besides, private pension plans are scarce in Spanish society. The public protection has made 
seen them as a unnecessary extra income, that actually is needed to sustain the system. For 
example, Denmark and Netherlands have a system in which private occupational schemes 
are mandatory, either through State regulation or by the agreements with labor unions. Also, 
voluntary schemes are popular in those countries, complimenting the public and mandatory 
systems.  The data shown in OECD (2015), proves this: where Netherlands has a coverage 
of (quasi-)mandatory plans of 88% and Denmark 83,3% and 63,3% for mandatory and quasi-
mandatory, Spain has 0%, because it is not compulsory in the country. Voluntary coverage 
is 28.3% and 22.4% for the first two countries, whereas in Spain is 18.6%. 
It is important, then, that Spain either promotes or forces the population to enroll in a private 
pension plan, so their income in old-age is not threatened and they can maintain a living 
standard.  
5. CONCLUSIONS. 
So far, all the questions contemplated at the beginning of the project have been covered, so 
the objective of the research has been successfully fulfilled. Many problems have arisen 
during its expounding, as its many literature is in some cases opposing or out-of-date due the 
constant reforms that countries perform. 
We have seen how some of the countries establish their pension system and how all of them 
are sensitive to demographic and economic changes. Furthermore, we have seen the Spanish 
system in a deeper way, how it evolved in time and how those demographic issues affect it. 
Finally, some changes for Spanish pensions have been proposed such as the reassessment of 
widowhood pension and the need of private pension plans, all of this looking to the way our 
neighbors deal with them.  
The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index has been computed for this particular project, 
in order to benchmark the Spanish pension system and to propose the necessary reforms 
that the government should carry out. We have discovered that the main problem lies in the 
sustainability, in which the coverage and size of private pension plans and the demographic 
characteristics of the Spanish state are contained.  
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Now that the computation of the scores has been made, future researches can use it to 
further look to the indicators of the Spanish pension system or to verify that the scores have 
been adequately computed. 
There are many different topics that are out of the scope of this paper, and would be 
interesting to review: survivor’s and disability pensions, the other sub-index of Melbourne 
Mercer Global Pension Index, the possible benefits of a Beveridge system in Spain… 
Researchers and politicians should expand their view towards new structural changes, rather 
than small reforms that help temporarily to maintain the system. Even though big reforms 
would have great transition costs, maybe they are the only answer to forget this sustainability 
problem in the future. This would be another appealing topic for further researches. 
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6. ANNEX: CALCULATION OF MELBOURNE MERCER GLOBAL PENSION 
INDEX. 
 Question 
Question 
Weight 
Score (/10) Answer 
A1 
What is the minimum pension, as a percentage of the average wage, that 
a single aged person will receive? 
17,5% 9,28 
33,90% 
How is the minimum pension increased or adjusted over time? Are these 
increases or adjustments made on a regular basis? 
Not regularly 
adjusted with 
inflation (1/2) 
A2 What is the net replacement rate for a median-income earner? 25% 10 89,50% 
A3 What is the net household saving rate in the country? 10% 5,43 8,59% 
A4 
Are voluntary member contributions made by a median-income earner 
to a funded pension plan treated by the tax system more favourably than 
similar savings in a bank account? 
5% 4 
Yes 
Is the investment income earned by pension plans exempt from tax in 
the pre retirement and/or post retirement periods? 
No 
A5 
Is there a minimum access age to receive benefits from the private 
pension plans (except for death, invalidity and/or cases of significant 
financial hardship)?   10% 10 
Yes 
If so, what is the current age? 60 
A6 
What proportion, if any, of the retirement benefit from the private 
pension arrangements is required to be taken as an income stream? 
10% 3 
No 
Are there any tax incentives that exist to encourage taking up of income 
streams? 
Yes 
A7 
On resignation from employment, are plan members normally entitled to 
the full vesting of their accrued benefit? 
7,5% 6,67 
Yes 
After resignation, is the value of the member's accrued benefit normally 
maintained in real terms (either by inflation-linked indexation or through 
market investment returns)? 
Sometimes 
Can a member's benefit entitlements normally be transferred to another 
private pension plan on the member's resignation from an employer? 
Sometimes 
A8 
Upon a couple's divorce or separation, are the individuals' accrued 
pension assets normally taken into account in the overall division of 
assets? 
4% 5 Sometimes 
A9 What is the level of home ownership in the country? 5% 8,26 77,80% 
A10 What is the proportion of total pension assets invested in growth assets? 5% 8,12 30,07% 
A11 
Are contributions to a funded pension scheme required to be paid if a 
worker receives income support (or income maintenance) when they are 
temporarily out of the workforce? 
1% 10 Yes 
Adequacy sub-index 40% 7,78  
S1 
What proportion of the working age population are members of private 
pension plans? 
20% 2,68 32,45% 
S2 
What is the level of pension assets, expressed as a percentage of GDP, 
held in private pension arrangements, public pension reserve funds, 
protected book reserves and pension insurance contracts? 
20% 0,81 14,30% 
S3 
What is the current gap between life expectancy at birth and the state 
pension age? 
20% 2,98 18 
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What is the projected gap between life expectancy at birth and the state 
pension age in 2035? (This calculation allows for mortality 
improvement.) 
20 
What is the projected old-age dependency ratio in 2035? 55,40% 
What is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) averaged over the last seven years? 1,33 
S4 
What is the level of mandatory contributions that are set aside for 
retirement benefits (ie funded), expressed as a percentage of wages? 
These include mandatory employer and/or employee contributions 
towards funded public benefits (ie social security) and/or private 
retirement benefits. 
15% 0 0 
S5 
What is the labour force participation rate for those aged 55-64? 
10% 3,65 
57,60% 
What is the labour force participation rate for those aged 65+? 1,90% 
S6 
What is the level of adjusted government debt (being the gross public 
debt reduced by the size of any sovereign wealth funds that are not set 
aside for future pension liabilities), expressed as a percentage of GDP? 
10% 0 0 
S7 
In respect of private pension arrangements, are older employees able to 
access part of their retirement savings or pension and continue working 
(eg part time)? 5% 9 
Yes 
If yes, can employees continue to contribute and accrue benefits at an 
appropriate rate? 
Sometimes 
Sustainability sub-index 35% 2,11  
R1 
Do private sector pension plans need regulatory approval or supervision 
to operate? 
7,5% 10 
Yes 
Is a private pension plan required to be a separate legal entity from the 
employer? 
Yes 
R2 
Are private sector pension plans required to submit a written report in a 
prescribed format to a regulator each year? 
10% 7,6 
Yes 
Does the regulator make industry data available from the submitted 
forms on a regular basis?  
Yes 
How actively does the regulator (or protector) discharge its supervisory 
responsibilities?  
Ocasionally 
active 
R3 
Where assets exist, are the private pension plan's 
trustees/executives/fiduciaries required to prepare an investment policy? 
12,5% 8,6 
Yes 
Are the private pension plan's trustees/executives/fiduciaries required to 
prepare a risk management policy? 
Yes 
Are the private pension plan's trustees/executives/fiduciaries required to 
prepare a conflicts of interest policy? 
Sometimes 
Are the private pension plan’s trustees/executives/fiduciaries required to 
have: 
·         an independent member included in the governing body? 
·         equal member and employer representation on the governing 
body? 
No/Yes 
R4 
Do the private pension plan's trustees/executives/fiduciaries have to 
satisfy any personal requirements set by the regulator?  
5% 7 
Yes 
Are the financial accounts of private pension plans (or equivalent) 
required to be audited annually by a recognised professional? 
Sometimes 
R5 
What is the government’s capacity to formulate and implement quality 
policies and to promote private sector development? 
15% 5,12 7,68 
What confidence do citizens have in the rules of society and the 
institutions that exercise power? 
How free are the country’s citizens to express their views? What is the 
likelihood of political instability or politically-motivated violence?  
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P1 
For defined benefit schemes, are there minimum funding requirements? 
What is the period over which any deficit or shortfall is normally 
funded?  
For defined contribution schemes, are the assets required to fully meet 
the members' accounts? 
10% 7 
Can 
be/15/Yes 
P2 
Are there any limits on the level of in-house assets held by a private 
sector pension plan? If yes, what are they? 
5% 0 30% 
P3 
Are the members' accrued benefits provided with any protection or 
reimbursement from an act of fraud or mismanagement within the fund?  
5% 6 
No 
In the case of employer insolvency (or bankruptcy), do any unpaid 
employer contributions receive priority over payments to other creditors, 
and/or are members' accrued benefits protected against claims of 
creditors? 
Yes 
P4 
When joining the pension plan, are new members required to receive 
information about the pension plan? 
5% 10 Yes 
P5 
Are plan members required to receive or have access to an annual report 
about the pension plan?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
5% 7 
Yes 
Is the annual report required to show: 
i. The allocation of the plan’s assets to major asset classes? 
ii. The major investments of the plan? 
Yes 
P6 
Are plan members required to receive an annual statement of their 
current personal benefits from the plan? 
7,5% 9 
Yes 
Is this annual statement to individual members required to show any 
projection of the member's possible retirement benefits? 
Yes 
P7 
Do plan members have access to a complaints tribunal which is 
independent from the pension plan? 
2,5% 2 No 
Costs 
What percentage of total pension assets is held in various types of 
pension funds? 
10% 9 
 
What percentage of total pension assets is held by the largest ten pension 
funds/providers?  
83,61% 
Integrity sub-index 25% 7,18  
Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 100% 5,65  
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